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ABSTRACT: In this paper I am concerned with the analysis of fragments of a discourse or text that express 
deductive arguments suspected of being denials of the antecedent. I will first argue that one needs to 
distinguish between two senses of ‘the argument expressed.’ Second, I will show that, with respect to one 
of these senses, given a Gricean account of the pragmatics of conditionals, some such fragments 
systematically express arguments that are valid. 
 





In this paper I am concerned with the analysis1 of fragments of discourse or text 
(utterances, in general), which contain deductive arguments suspected of being denials of 
the antecedent (DA from now on). I will focus on pragmatic aspects of argument analysis 
with respect to the identification of the premises of the argument. I will first argue that 
one needs to distinguish between two senses of ‘the argument expressed.’ Second, I will 
show that, with respect to one of these senses, some such fragments express arguments 
that are valid, and do not instantiate DA. I will appeal to a Gricean account of the 
pragmatics of conditionals in order to support my conclusion. Finally, I will discuss and 
reject an objection to my thesis. 
 
2. THE FALLACY OF DENYING THE ANTECEDENT 
 
Some deductive arguments instantiate the fallacy of denying the antecedent, which is to 
say that they have the form: If p, q. ¬p. Therefore, ¬q. The arguments that instantiate this 
form are usually materially invalid, which is to say that the premises can be all true and 
the conclusion false. However, not all such arguments are materially invalid. Due to 
 
1 See Ralph Johnson (2000 p.40) for the distinction between two aspects of the study of argument: the 
descriptive and the evaluative one. The former is the subject matter of the Theory of Analysis, the latter, of 
the Theory of Appraisal. 
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semantic entailments, or due to the fact that they instantiate another valid logical form, 
some of them are materially valid.2 
Material validity is defined in terms of truth. So, if deductive arguments can be 
evaluated for validity they must have structural elements that are capable of bearing a 
truth-value. I will take these elements, such as p and q above, to be propositions.3 So, I 
will assume a deductive argument has in its structure a set of propositions P = {p1, … pn, 
c}, where p1, … pn are the premises and c the conclusion. This is not a definition of 
argument. It is no more than a tool useful for reconstructing and evaluating deductive 
arguments. Identifying such a set of propositions as the logical structure of a deductive 
argument is compatible with defining deductive argument in terms of criteria most 
proper for their evaluation, as Erick Krabbe does. He writes that by ‘deductive 
arguments’ he means “(single) arguments that invite an evaluation in terms of deductive 
criteria, even though they may not exclude the use of other criteria.” (Krabbe 2003, p. 1) 
The Theory of Analysis deals with the problem of how to identify and reconstruct 
an argument that is put forward in a text or oral discourse. Its aim is then that of 
interpreting a fragment of a text or discourse or a contribution to a dialog. With respect to 
deductive arguments, and with respect to the issue of their evaluation for validity, the 
problem comes down to identifying, among all the propositions a fragment of text or 
discourse conveys, the propositions that constitute the set P of the argument. 
 
3. PRAGMATICS ASPECTS OF INTERPRETATION 
 
In order to approach the problem of how to identify P, I will mention briefly some points 
that have been traditionally made about the interpretation of any discourse or text, be it 
argumentative or not. 
First of all, one useful concept is that of what is said, a concept introduced by H. 
P. Grice (1989, p. 25). This is the proposition literally expressed by the sentence uttered. 
This characterization may not be accurate: in uttering ambiguous sentences more than 
one proposition is literally expressed. In that case what is said is not only the proposition 
literally expressed (because more than one is literally expressed), but also the one 
intended by the speaker. To identify this proposition as the relevant one the hearer 
appeals to information about the context in which the sentence was uttered. Contextual 
information is also relevant in interpreting indexical or demonstrative expressions, as 
well as in ellipsis and anaphora resolution. 
The context also plays an essential role in getting at other propositions that 
speakers communicate apart form what is said by their utterances. Speakers may make 
use of irony, suggestion, metaphor, presupposition, and so on. Grice has called some of 
the propositions that speakers mean by their utterances ‘implicatures.’ Implicatures 
always differ from what is said, but may be entailed by what is said, or merely suggested 
by it. Conversational implicatures are those implicatures that depend heavily on the 
details of the context in which an utterance is made. With respect to these implicatures, 
                                                 
2 See Godden & Walton (2004, p. 222) for examples and a discussion of such cases. 
3 Johnson (2000, p.168) defines argument in terms that make no reference to propositions, premisses or 
conclusion. Other authors are less radical in eschewing talk of propositions. Robert Pinto writes: “A set of 
propositions constitutes a set of premisses and a conclusion p if and only if someone puts them forward as 
premisses for p in the course of arguing for p.” (Pinto 2001, p.1) 
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Grice argues that they are always derivable, which means that a hearer should only 
interpret a speaker as implicating a proposition if she is in the position to infer the 
proposition implicated from what is said, other information available in the context of 
utterance, and the assumption that the speaker acts according to the conversational 
maxims of rational and cooperative behaviour. Grice writes:  
 
The final test for the presence of a conversational implicatures has to be, as far as I can see, a 
derivation of it. One has to produce an account of how it could have arisen and why it is there. 
And I am very much opposed to any kind of sloppy use of this philosophical tool, in which one 
does not fulfil this condition. (Grice 1981, p. 187, quoted in Neale 1990)  
 
Stephen Neale refers to the requirement that Grice places on interpreters as the 
Justification Requirement (Neale 1990, p. 78). The inferential schema behind the 
requirement can be summarized as follows: a hearer is justified in taking a speaker to 
conversationally implicate that proposition which the speaker must be assumed to believe 
in order to preserve the assumption that the speaker is adhering to the conversational 
maxims. In order to avoid violations of conversational maxims, the speaker must be taken 
to intend to communicate more than what is said by her utterance.  
             As Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber make clear, the inference behind the 
Justification Requirement “plays little if any role in the recovery of implicatures” (Wilson 
& Sperber 1986, p. 378). Getting at what proposition a speaker implicates is a question of 
hypothesis formation, which is usually dealt with intuitively by interpreters. It was not 
among Grice’s aims to clarify this process. His aim was rational reconstruction of 
speaker’s communicative intentions. The Justification Requirement plays an essential 
role in the latter, but not in the former. I will come back to this point later. 
 
4. TWO CONCEPTS OF ‘THE ARGUMENT EXPRESSED’ 
 
Rational reconstruction of what is implicit in a text or discourse that is suspected of 
putting forward a deductive argument is relevant to the Theory of Analysis of arguments, 
given that utterances need to be interpreted for the deductive argument to be identified. 
Explicitness is an important value in argumentation, as well as in communication in 
general.4 But there is no reason to restrict the interpretation of a text or discourse merely 
to what is explicitly stated, excluding implicatures or presuppositions from the 
interpretation. Suppose we restrict the interpretation only to what is said by each of the 
utterances of the discourse or text. Appealing to argument indicators, as well as to 
metalinguistic indications (if available) about what the speaker intends to do and how, we 
would then obtain a set P of propositions, one of which is the conclusion, the other the 
premisses of an argument. Let us call the argument that has this structure argument-w 
(‘w’ from what is said). Similar considerations, but this time taking into account also the 
propositions meant but not literally expressed, would lead to what we can call the 
argument-m (‘m’ from meant) conveyed. So ‘the argument expressed’ can be understood 
in at least two senses: the argument literally expressed by the sentences uttered; and the 
argument speaker-meant, which includes in P implicatures and presuppositions. 
                                                 
4 For the value of explicitness for argumentation, see Adler (2002, pp. 86-91) 
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Whether it is more important to focus on argument-w or on argument-m is a 
question that I do not want to settle here. I do not even know whether it has one answer, 
or whether the answer depends on our purposes as evaluators. What I claim is that, in as 
much as reconstructing the argument-m that a speaker conveys is important, attention 
should be paid to pragmatic elements involved, and especially to implicatures.  
 
5. CONDITIONAL PERFECTION 
 
In what follows I will focus on one kind of implicature that has been studied extensively, 
and which serves to interpret certain linguistic phenomena. What is usually called 
‘Conditional Perfection’ (CP) is a phenomenon that consists in the tendency that people 
have in certain conditions to treat utterances of ‘If p then q’ as expressing not only that p 
is a sufficient condition for q, but also that it is a necessary condition. That is to say, 
people tend to treat ‘If p then q’ as expressing q, if and only if p. This phenomenon is 
independent of whether the context is one in which arguments are given and evaluated, or 
not. For example, when dad says to the son ‘If you mow the lawn, I will give you five 
dollars’ he may be taken to have asserted that only if the kid mows the loan he will give 
him 5$. One of the first to have observed this phenomenon was Oswald Ducrot (1969), 
followed by M. Geis and A. Zwicky (1971), who rediscovered it.5 In the terminology of 
the latter, the utterance of ‘If p (then) q’ literally expresses if p, (then) q and suggests, or 
invites the inference to q, only if p, which can be better expressed as if not-p then not-q.6 
Most authors have argued that the tendency to perfect conditionals is to be 
explained as an essentially linguistic phenomenon. Given that these authors take ‘if’ as 
lexically unambiguous, largely for the reasons that Grice (1989 pp.47-49) put forward 
against multiplying senses by postulating ambiguities, it is natural to expect a pragmatic 
explanation of CP. The phenomenon is usually treated as involving pragmatic 
strengthening of the content of the utterance, in the sense that the invited inference is to 
be explained as an implicature. However, not all authors agree on the details of the 
explanation. 
Geis and Zwicky argue that, “what we have called ‘invited inferences’ constitutes 
a special class of ‘implicatures,’ although they are clearly distinct from the 
‘conversational implicatures’” (Geis & Zwicky 1971, p. 5). More recent authors, such as 
J. van der Auwera (1997) and L. Horn (2000), consider that CP is due to a scalar 
conversational implicature that is triggered by the utterance of the conditional. They 
assume that the literal meaning of ‘if’ is such that it introduces a sufficient condition for 
the consequent to be the case. However, they differ in their account of the scalar 
implicature. Van der Auwera considers the scale of propositions S as involved in deriving 
the implicature. The proposition at the bottom constitutes what is said by dad’s utterance. 
The higher propositions in the scale have not been uttered. They are composed 
propositions that include reference to other sufficient conditions for the truth of q. Given 
that the upper ones entail the lower ones they are more informative. 
 
                                                 
5 For a history of the successive rediscoveries of CP, see van der Auwera (1997). 
6 Horn points out that it has been observed that ‘q only if p’ is better paraphrased by ‘If not-p then not-q’ 
(which is the inverse of the conditional) than by ‘If q then p,’ or by ‘p if q,’ at least when p and q have 
different temporal and causal implications. I will follow this suggestion. 
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(S)  ... 
     if p, q and if r, q and if s, q 
     if p, q and if r, q 
     if p, q 
 
Van der Auwera explains the Gricean derivation of the implicature that p is a necessary 
condition:  
 
Standard scalar implicatures arise as negations of the higher assertions, and this is also what we 
find here… when one supplies only the one sufficient condition p, one conversationally implicates 
that there is no second - and no third, etc. - sufficient condition. (van der Auwera 1997, p. 262) 
 
Given the presumption that the speaker observes the maxim of Quantity (in particular, the 
first submaxim, which requires that the speaker make her contribution as informative as 
is needed for purposes of the exchange), and given her utterance of ‘if p, q,’ the audience 
in the position to infer that r or s are not sufficient conditions for the truth of q. So only p 
is, which means it is a necessary condition as well. If r and s had been sufficient 
conditions for q, the speaker would have violated the maxim by not mentioning them. So 
they are not. Thus, ‘One is allowed to sit in this seat if one is disabled or if one is older 
than 70’ implicates that there is no other sufficient condition for being allowed to seat in 
that chair. 
Other accounts of CP consider other scales. I will favor in what follows van der 
Auwera’s scale S because it takes into account the contextual nature of CP. CP does not 
occur always, but only when other conditions are at least in principle possible. If no other 
conditions except p are in principle possible, we are not dealing with pragmatic 
enrichment, but logical relations. The variables s and r stand for other possible conditions 
that are relevant in the context. Given that the speaker does not mention them, the hearer 
is licensed to infer that they are not sufficient conditions. 
 
6. CASE STUDIES 
 
Keeping in mind van der Auwera’s account of the scalar implicature involved in CP, let 
us go back to the issue of interpreting utterances that convey deductive arguments. 
Consider the case of a child uttering: 
 
(1) ‘If I finish my homework, my dad will let me play basketball. I will not finish 
my homework. So, he will not let me play.’ 
 
Suppose the child’s utterances are part of a conversation with a friend of hers. Suppose 
also that the child’s father had told her: ‘If you finish your homework you are allowed to 
play basketball.’ The presence of ‘so’ indicates that the child intends to put forward an 
argument. Consider the distinction made above between the argument-w and the 
argument-m that a fragment of discourse may express. The argument-w expressed by her 
utterance has the form: if H, P. ¬H. Therefore, ¬P. So the argument-w instantiates DA. 
Given that there are no meaning relations between the terms used that would make this 
argument a case of semantic entailment, we should conclude that the argument is invalid. 
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There are cases in which the premises are true and the conclusion false. There may be 
other sufficient conditions for the child to be allowed to go play basketball.  
Let us consider now the argument-m. Given her dad’s utterance, it is reasonable 
for the child to think that doing the homework is a necessary condition for being allowed 
to go play. That is, her dad’s assertion invited the child to ‘perfect’ the conditional, and 
the child did so in interpreting his utterance, and consequently in her own utterance of it 
in (1). In this case we are justified in interpreting both the father and the child as 
implicating the revered conditional. Scale S can be used to derive the implicature that 
there are no other sufficient conditions relevant in the context, and so that the condition of 
finishing the homework is necessary for the truth of the consequent. If there were other 
conditions (maybe cleaning her room, mowing the loan, or taking the dog for a walk, 
which play the role of r and s in the scale) the father is expected to have mentioned them, 
in as much as he is presumed to observe the first submaxim of Quantity. 
If this is so, we should take the child to interpret his father’s utterance as 
communicating a necessary condition for the truth of the consequent, not merely a 
sufficient one. Given that the child merely reproduces the utterance, it is also reasonable 
to interpret the child’s utterance in the same way. Even if the argument that results from 
considering only what is said by the child’s contribution, is invalid, the argument-m, that 
considers the propositions speaker-meant as well, is valid. If the implicature is that only if 
I finish my homework, my dad will let me play basketball, which is better expressed as if I 
do not finish my homework, my dad will not let me play basketball, the argument-m has 
the form: if ¬H, ¬P. ¬H. So, ¬P. This is a valid modus ponens argument. Of course, the 
argument-m also has the premiss explicitly stated, if H, P. But this premise does not 
influence the validity of the argument. 
Whether this argument is the argument the speaker expressed, or whether it is the 
only one that should interest us, are further question that I have no intention to settle now. 
However, I take it that there are strong reasons to think that this argument-m is of certain 
interest, reasons which have to do with the general interpretative strategies of speaker-
meaning that I mentioned in section 2. Given that conditional perfection is in this case 
justified, in a certain sense, a sense related to argument-m, no fallacy has been 
committed.7 
 
7. A FEW CLARIFICATIONS 
 
A few clarifications are needed. First, my reason for treating the child’s utterance as not 
expressing a fallacious argument-m differs from some reasons that have been given in the 
literature for a similar conclusion. Thus, Michael Burke (1994) argues in favor of 
interpreting utterances similar to (1) as not expressing a fallacious argument. His strategy 
is based on the claim that a non-fallacious interpretation is always preferable “unless the 
                                                 
7 One could say that in this case the argument superficially is of a DA form, but actually it is a modus 
ponens. David Hitchcock analyses a fragment of text somehow similar to (1) and writes: “there is a valid 
form of argument, which can superficially look like the predicate-logic analogue of denying the 
antecedent” (Hitchcock 1995), although it is not of that form, according to his interpretation of the text. 
However, I want to avoid talking about the argument expressed. It is not clear to me that we should always 
focus on the argument-m, and that this is the argument expressed. It may be useful in a context of 
argumentation to focus on the argument-w, and consequently to attribute fallacy to the speaker. This may 
contribute to enhancing explicitness. 
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balance of textual, contextual, and other evidence” (Burke 1994, p. 24) favours the 
fallacious interpretation. And so, he suggests that one should take the conditional as not 
being asserted with the intention of making it a premise in the argument, but only for 
rhetorical or dialectical reasons. He holds that this is a possible interpretation, and that it 
should be preferred on the grounds of a weak charity principle (what he calls ‘fairness’ in 
interpretation). D. Godden and D. Walton reply that in all such cases “there is a very 
good reason to suppose that the stated conditional claim is part of the argument: namely, 
that it is stated.” (Godden & Walton 2004, p. 226) My reasons for rejecting fallacy 
attribution in (1) have nothing to do with charity considerations. I have not argued that 
the speaker must have meant by the conditional a bi-conditional just for the reason of 
avoiding attributing a fallacy to the speaker. Instead, I have offered a Gricean justification 
for believing that the inverse of the conditional has also been conveyed.8 If it has been 
conveyed within the fragment of discourse that contains the argument we should treat is 
as part of the argument. The fact that we also treat both the conditional and its inverse as 
premises of the argument-m will not affect the validity of the argument. 
Second, I want to point out that my account of why (1) expresses a valid 
argument-m should be clearly distinguished from an account of whether one is justified or 
not in believing the inverse of a conditional. Although the child has not committed the 
fallacy of DA in the argument-m she put forward, she may have argued from false or 
unacceptable premises. She may have not been justified in holding the conditional and/or 
its inverse. Actually, in (1) the child is justified in believing (1), given that she has the 
information directly from her father. In other cases a speaker may have inductive grounds 
for believing a conditional and its inverse, such as when one believes that both ‘If it has 
rained the streets are wet’ and its inverse are true. 
On the other hand, even if one is justified in holding the inverse to be true, it is 
not clear such inductive grounds can justify one in perfecting the conditional, that is, in 
interpreting an utterance of a conditional as implicating a bi-conditional. Suppose 
someone utters (2), as in Aristotle famous example, with the purpose of giving an 
argument: 
(2) ‘If it has rained the streets are wet. It did not rain. So, the streets are not wet.’ 
The Gricean account of CP appealed to so far does not yield the result that the speaker 
implicates the inverse of the conditional in (2): in a scale S of propositions (in which r 
and s are conditions such as the cleaning of streets with water, a river flood etc), and 
under the assumption that the speaker observes the first submaxim of Quantity (Make 
your contribution as informative as is needed for the purposes of the exchange), the 
hearer might conclude that there are no other sufficient conditions apart from rain. This is 
what the reasoning schema behind the scalar implicature involved in CP seems to predict. 
But the hearer knows (and knows the speaker believes) that there are other sufficient 
conditions. Attributing to the speaker the intention to implicate that the condition is 
necessary would then conflict with the assumption that the speaker observes the first 
maxim of Quality (Be truthful). So, the Gricean schema for deriving implicatures does 
not allow for CP in (2). Of course, the hearer may still be highly charitable and avoid 
                                                 
8 Such Gricean considerations show that Wesley Salmon was right in his comments on an example similar 
to (1): “Actually, people often say “if” when they mean “if and only if”; if the first premiss is construed in 
that way, the argument, of course, becomes valid, though it loses some of its rhetorical force.” (Salmon, 
1984, my emphasis) 
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fallacy attribution by taking the speaker to be truthfully holding, on inductive grounds, a 
modified inverse of the conditional, such as: if the streets are wet, probably it has rained. 
The speaker would than be assumed to observe both maxims mentioned. But the only 
reason for being so charitable is to avoid fallacy attribution. I have not argued in favour 
of such a move. 
One last observation before I pass to consider a possible objection. With respect 
to the generality of the analysis mentioned, the account of (1) given should not encourage 
drawing the conclusion that all contributions that are such that the argument-w expressed 
is of DA form, while the conditional invites perfection, should be interpreted as cases in 
which the argument-m is a valid modus ponens. It does not follow from the account of 
CP presented above that we should conclude this. Gricean accounts of implicatures are 
not psychological hypothesis, so they are not explanations of all tendencies to perfect 
conditionals. As Kent Bach writes: 
 
Grice did not intend his account of how implicatures are recognized as a psychological theory or 
even as a cognitive model. He intended it as a rational reconstruction. When he illustrated the 
ingredients involved in recognizing an implicature, he was enumerating the sorts of information 
that a hearer needs to take into account, at least intuitively, and exhibiting how this information is 
logically organized. He was not foolishly engaged in psychological speculation about the nature of 
or even the temporal sequence of the cognitive processes that implements that logic. (Bach 2006, 
p. 8) 
 
Gricean accounts of CP are rational reconstruction of some cases in which people treat 
sentences of the form ‘if p, q’ as expressing bi-conditionals; more precisely, of those 
cases in which a scalar implicature is present. They are not reconstructions of all such 
cases because not all of them are rational (i.e. justified) conversions of the conditional. 
Not in all cases in which there is a tendency of the audience to take a conditional as 
expressing a bi-conditional, the scalar implicature is present. A Gricean account of 
implicature is compatible with there being cases in which the audience takes the speaker 
to have implicated something, but the Justification Requirement is not satisfied, so there 
is no reason to consider that an implicature is present. Similarly, a Gricean account of CP 
is compatible with there being cases in which we treat the conditional as a bi-conditional, 
but no scalar implicature is actually present. The above reconstructions explain our 
tendency to (intuitively) perfect conditionals only in as much as the tendency is rational, 
and so can be rationally reconstructed. But sometimes intuitions are not reliable. As 
several authors have pointed out, people tend to perfect the conditional especially in cases 
of promises, threats, warnings, prohibitions or commands. In most of these cases, such as 
(1), the derivation of the scalar implicature seems possible, so the tendency is usually 
justified. But sometimes people perfect the conditional when they should not: “Ever since 
Aristotle pinpointed the temptation to infer If the streets are wet, it has rained and If he's 
hot, he has a fever, however, it has also been clear that the conversion or perfection of 
conditionals cannot be restricted to warnings, threats, or promises.” (Horn 2000, p. 319) 
That is, CP is sometimes performed when it should not be. 
 
8. AN OBJECTION REJECTED 
 
Let me discuss now one possible objection to my account of (1) and other similar cases. 
Jonathan Adler suggests a different interpretation of this case: 
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[A]n obvious alternative to viewing the child as fallaciously reversing a conditional is that the 
child treats his conditional as really a bi-conditional. My claim is that there need be no rivalry 
between the view that the child meant his conditional as a bi-conditional, and that his reasoning 
involved a fallacious reversal of the conditional. For the child’s meaning by that conditional a bi-
conditional, is itself plausibly due to his treating the conditional as reversible. (Adler 1994, p. 227) 
 
If someone treats a conditional as reversible it is either because she has reasons to think 
the sufficient condition is also necessary, and so that the inverse is true, as I have argued 
the child in (1) does; or, because she does not distinguish between the meanings of ‘if’ 
and of ‘only if.’ Adler cannot mean the former, because in that case there is no reason to 
attribute fallacy to the child. He must mean the latter: the child and people in general are 
here accused of not having a good grasp of the literal meaning of ‘if.’ That is, people 
confuse9 what is said by a sentence of the form ‘if p, (then) q’ in virtue of its literal 
meaning with the perfected conditional, i.e. with the biconditional. 
What I have argued above is that in cases such as (1) in which the argument-w 
may be DA, the argument-m is not of DA form, but is modus ponens, given that the 
scalar implicature is a premise in the argument. But the objection goes: the confusion of 
the child about the meaning of ‘if,’ which she treated as if it meant if and only if, explains 
why she meant a bi-conditional by her utterance of (1). There are no implicatures 
involved, but merely confusion about what the first sentence in (1) says. The child 
misunderstood the sentence she uttered. It is her confusion that explains her reversing the 
conditional, not the reasoning involved in scalar implicatures. There is no implicature 
conveyed. All that we have is the argument-w, which is of DA form.10 Fallacy attribution 
is then unavoidable. 
This objection is not as strong as it may seem. If conditional perfection is 
systematically due to confusing the literal meaning of ‘if’ for that of ‘if and only if,’ then 
it should lead to erroneous results systematically. However, this is not so. As I have 
pointed out above, it has been argued in the literature11 on CP that people perfect the 
conditional more frequently in situations in which the condition is indeed both necessary 
and sufficient. And, in those situations, this is a rational thing to do. So it cannot be due 
to a systematic error about the meaning of ‘if,’ because it cannot be due to an error at all. 
The explanation of CP embraced in this essay makes of CP a rational thing to do in those 
cases in which the condition is (and the speaker believes it to be) a necessary one. People 
may tend to perfect conditionals even in cases such as (2), where the condition is not 
necessary (and cannot be reasonably believed to be). A scalar implicature is not derivable 
in those cases, as I have pointed out with (2). Those are indeed to be explained as some 
sort of confusions, given that the condition is actually not necessary. But in cases such as 
(1), it is reasonable for the child to treat the condition as necessary, so it is reasonable for 
                                                 
9 The idea that there is a confusion involved in such cases comes up in the writings of other authors as well: 
“Perhaps we tend to confuse If A, then B with If B, then A because if B follows from A, it is fairly common 
for A to follow from B also.” (Cederblom & Paulsen 2006, p. 165, my emphasis). Also C. Tindale: “It is 
clear that if we have one form that is valid and another that is very similar to it but invalid, then someone 
could confuse the two. That is why formal fallacies are sometimes called fallacies of resemblance.” 
(Tindale 2007, p. 50 my emphasis) 
10 Adler’s words suggest this line of reasoning. However, if my interpretation of his words is incorrect, this 
objection remains a possible one and needs to be dealt with. 
11 See Horn (2000) for a presentation of the empirical results obtained by psycholinguists about which types 




us, as interpreters, to attribute to her the intention to convey the implicature that the 
condition is necessary. In such cases, one should not attribute fallacy with respect to the 
argument-m. This I would like to be the conclusion of my paper. 
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